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ABSTRACT
This article explores the relationship between Jordan and the United States (US) 
in the field of nuclear energy cooperation. Since 2010 the Jordanian government 
has accelerated its plans for a nuclear energy program and has engaged with 
multiple partners around the world in order to agree terms for cooperation in 
technology exchange, monitoring, and the construction of infrastructure. Bilateral 
negotiations between the US and Jordan for a “123” nuclear cooperation agreement 
were underway by early 2008, but were suspended in 2011 without an agreement 
being reached. Jordanian nuclear energy policy has been spurred by energy secu-
rity considerations (as it currently imports 97 percent of its energy needs) and the 
discovery of up to 120,000 tonnes of uranium ore in Jordan. At the same time, the 
US is primarily interested in management of nuclear technology proliferation. This 
work considers the perceptions of self and other in Jordanian and US policymaking 
in order to understand why bilateral cooperation has not materialized and what 
this means for nuclear proliferation in Jordan. This study finds that the US–
Jordanian negotiations have been impeded by contradictory objectives and 
perceptions, and a “123” agreement is not likely in the short to medium term, but that 
development of Jordan’s nuclear energy program will likely continue regardless. 
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In the past decade, nuclear technology proliferation in the Middle East 
has increased rapidly. A number of states, including Jordan, Egypt, the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and of course Iran, 
are currently developing nuclear programs. Some of these programs are 
quite advanced (as in Iran), while others are at an early stage of planning 
(such as in Jordan). In all cases, bilateral and multilateral negotiations 
with nuclear supplier states1 under international law have taken place with 
varying degrees of success. In the current climate, enhancing bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation in the field of nuclear energy may be the most 
effective way to ensure that the proliferation of nuclear technologies for 
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peaceful purposes does not lead to these same technologies being used for 
non-peaceful purposes (the proliferation of nuclear weapons). However, 
some scholars argue that the proliferation of nuclear technology and 
nuclear weapons are directly linked (Fuhrmann, 2009a; Kroenig, 2009a). 
In this view, transparency, international cooperation, and the existence 
of security threats are all seen to have significant impacts on the direction 
nuclear technology programs take. 
Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is at a crossroads, with the 
potential for relatively insulated programs (as has taken place in Iran) 
to develop in countries like Egypt (a worrying prospect given political 
instability there), Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Alternatively, as the case 
of the UAE demonstrates, transparent and multilateral programs may 
also emerge, but these are based on international negotiations and the 
cooperation that they embed. Understanding the causes of the success 
or failure of international negotiations aimed at promoting international 
cooperation is, therefore, important. In the case of US–Jordanian rela-
tions, bilateral nuclear cooperation negotiations took place between 
2008 and 2011 but were unsuccessful. Analyzing the reasons why 
may prove useful in understanding whether similar negotiations with 
other states in the region and beyond will succeed or fail, as well as 
whether or not nuclear programs in the Middle East will be insulated 
or transparent.
Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, including “123” agreements,2 
allow for the exchange of technology, expertise, material, financial capital, 
and the development of infrastructure between the signatories, and so 
can be useful when non-nuclear states seek to establish nuclear energy 
programs. Furthermore, without such an agreement, corporations based in 
one state will often not be authorized to pursue contracts with the foreign 
government seeking nuclear energy. For states seeking to develop nuclear 
energy, these agreements, and especially “123” agreements with the US, 
are important. However, in the case of “123” agreements, the applicant 
state must adhere to the US-mandated nuclear non-proliferation norms 
(National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA], 2012). The failure 
to sign a “123” agreement with the US represents a significant problem 
for both states – hindering the development of its program in the case 
of the former and not meeting goals on non-proliferation for the latter.
This article examines the reasons why the US–Jordanian negotiations 
failed and what the impact on nuclear proliferation in Jordan may be and 
whether a return to negotiations is possible in the future. Specifically, 
I analyze decision-makers’ perceptions of energy insecurity in Jordan, 
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the political economy of nuclear energy there. I also explore how the 
two governments’ perceptions of these issues differ. This is achieved by 
employing a theoretical model that draws upon a constructivist analysis 
of agency, self-perception, and perceptions of the “other” to determine 
how interests, threats/security, and policy have been identified by the 
governments in Amman and Washington. This study also seeks to test 
the applicability of this model to this specific case of bilateral nuclear 
cooperation negotiations and to offer conclusions as to its applicability 
to nuclear cooperation agreements in general.
I argue that Jordanian decision-makers believe that Jordan faces severe 
energy insecurity; that they believe this is one of the most significant long-
term security threats Jordan faces as it undermines development; and 
that the Jordanian government perceives nuclear energy as a solution. At 
the same time, I argue that the US government does not hold the same 
perception of the Jordanian nuclear energy program and wants Jordan 
to adhere to the US-mandated non-proliferation norms.3
Analyzing Nuclear Technology Proliferation
Some scholars (Fuhrmann, 2009b; Gartzke & Jo, 2009; Sagan, 1996) 
emphasize the importance of security threats as leading states to pursue 
nuclear weapons and claim that this policy is more likely where civil-
ian nuclear technologies are present (especially when cooperation with 
a nuclear supplier state takes place). However, in over six decades of 
international nuclear technology cooperation and proliferation, only four 
states outside of the five victors of World War II (the original nuclear 
power states) have developed nuclear weapons, and each one faced a 
clear external existential threat from external states with which each had 
already fought at least one conventional war at the time that they began 
to pursue nuclear weapons.4 But this leaves unaddressed questions of 
nuclear proliferation where external existential threats are not present, 
are unlikely to emerge in the short to medium (or even long) term, and 
does not account for other forms of insecurity. 
Matthew Fuhrmann (2009b) argues that there can be a direct corre-
lation between the proliferation of civilian nuclear technology through 
international cooperation and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
He draws a link between the development of nuclear capacity for 
civilian purposes through the transfer of sensitive technologies, the 
training of personnel, and the construction of nuclear infrastructure, 
and external security threats in encouraging decision-makers to pursue 
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nuclear weapons. However, Fuhrmann does not offer a discussion of 
how security threats are identified by decision-makers and how their 
responses are formed. In this article, I explore these questions by exam-
ining the role of the perceptions of decision-makers in Amman and 
Washington. I analyze how decision-makers perceive threats and what 
security issues are significant in shaping policy with regards to bilateral 
nuclear cooperation. Here, self-perceptions of rights, roles, responsibili-
ties, security/insecurity, interests, and capabilities (agency) have been 
analyzed, along with perceptions of the other with regards to these issues.
Other work considers why nuclear supplier states cooperate with those 
pursuing civilian nuclear capabilities. Fuhrmann (2009a, p. 182), for exam-
ple, argues that states provide nuclear assistance to: “(1) strengthen their 
allies and alliances, (2) to strengthen their relationship with enemies of 
enemies, and (3) to strengthen existing democracies and bilateral relation-
ships with these countries (if the supplier is also a democracy).” However, 
in the case of the US–Jordanian negotiations, Fuhrmann’s analysis is only 
partially applicable and does not fully explain why negotiations broke down 
in 2011. The first of the above statements does apply to Jordan (it being a 
close ally of the US), the second statement partially applies (for example, 
Jordan supporting US policy toward Iran), and the third statement does 
not (Jordanian governance has some democratic characteristics but is not 
democratic by the vast majority of accounts). But this approach does not 
explain the relationship between the three defining characteristics, and 
does not account for variations in how alliances, enemies, democracies 
are defined, leading to further questions being raised. Can one or more 
of these statements be partially applicable for nuclear cooperation to be 
forthcoming? How do nuclear supplier states account for variations in the 
nature of the relationships with other states? How do they determine the 
extent to which a state is an ally in the absence of formal bilateral treaties 
(which are increasingly rare)? Are their comparative variations in how 
close allies can be and how much of an enemy of your enemy another 
state may be? How democratic must states be to fit with the third state-
ment (after all, there is no one universally applicable democratic model; 
see Andrain & Smith, 2006)?
In a similar way, Leeds, Long & Mitchell (2000) also focus on the stra-
tegic interests of supplier states and how these determine whether they 
cooperate with states seeking nuclear assistance, but these studies tend 
to take strategic interests for granted as existing outside of the views and 
cognitive capacities of the decision-makers responsible for policymaking. 
As Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas Wheeler (2010) demonstrate, attention 
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also needs to be paid to intangible features of international relations 
and foreign (especially nuclear) policymaking in order to present more 
complete conclusions on specific cases of bilateral nuclear cooperation. 
Ruzicka and Wheeler focus on trust as a key issue in determining the 
existence of/lack of cooperation between states in nuclear cooperation, 
and conclude that this factor has a significant impact on decision-makers 
and their choices of whether to cooperate with others or not. The cur-
rent study seeks to develop an understanding of why the US–Jordanian 
negotiations failed, as well as to debate on why and when states engage 
in nuclear cooperation more generally, by exploring how individual 
and collective perceptions of interests, insecurity, rights, roles, and other 
factors influence state policy.
Matthew Kroenig (2009a) highlights that much literature on nuclear 
proliferation tends to focus on “the demand side of nuclear proliferation” 
(ibid., p. 114) and offers a counter analysis that focuses on the supply 
side. His analysis demonstrates that “the strategic environment of the 
nuclear supplier” (ibid., p. 127) along with its strategic interests play a 
significant role in promoting or hindering bilateral nuclear cooperation. 
The data Kroenig’s analysis is based upon are compelling; however, by 
focusing on one side of the relationship (the supply side), space is left for 
questions about the nature of bilateral relationships and the impact the 
combination of factors on both the demand side and supply side have on 
nuclear cooperation. Analyzing both sides at the same time can be useful 
here. Furthermore, questions can be raised regarding how the strategic 
environment and strategic interests are identified by decision-makers 
and how they can be analyzed by observers as these can be relative to 
time and space. Kroenig (2009b) also explores the potential impacts on 
nuclear weapons proliferation that the export of certain types of sensitive 
technologies can have (again, a supply-side analysis), which reinforces 
earlier conclusions with its comprehensive data analysis. It is useful here 
to consider work by Grzelczyk (2009) which discusses issues of transpar-
ency and the monitoring of the use of nuclear technologies in states that 
have been supplied with material via international cooperation of one 
kind or another. Grzelczyk demonstrates that differences in the level of 
transparency and multilateralism in a state’s nuclear programs can have an 
impact on how external actors (including supplier states) behave toward 
it. This article engages with both areas of discussion at the same time in 
considering the US and Jordanian policy.
But understanding and explaining a state’s national interests is not as 
straightforward as some approaches assume. By using a constructivist 
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framework, Jutta Weldes (1996) offers a good overview of approaches to 
national interests, identifying two broad categories: one camp that sees 
little value in the term due to its indeterminate meaning, oversimplifica-
tion, and commonsensical appeal; and a second that views the national 
interest as a key concept that should be central to our study of state 
behavior (ibid., pp. 275–276). Weldes (ibid., p. 276) sits within this latter 
camp and argues that “the national interest is important to international 
politics…[because] it is through the national interest that policy-makers 
understand the goals to be pursued by a state’s foreign policy.” Weldes 
explores how national interests, and by extension policy, can be conceptu-
alized and demonstrates that analyzing state policy as a social construction 
can be beneficial. She argues that interpretation, language, and cognitive 
representation play important roles in determining interests and policy, 
and that these, as Alexander Wendt (1992) has demonstrated, can vary 
over time and space. I adopt a similar approach to Weldes, which utilizes 
principles of social constructivism pertaining to individual and group per-
ceptions (discussed next), in this study to explore the interests, policies, 
and preferences of the Jordanian and US governments. 
Perceptions, Agency, and Decision-making 
To more fully understand why the US–Jordanian “123” negotiations 
failed, it is necessary to consider the ways in which the respective gov-
ernments’ interests and policies have been constructed. In order to do 
this, we need to consider the collective and individual perceptions of 
the decision-makers, in particular with regard to the Jordan’s energy 
insecurity, rights under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 
and the potential for nuclear energy to ensure energy security. This is 
because viewing states as unitary actors with a single identity and set of 
goals that remain static for long periods of time and only change slowly 
restricts our understanding of how governments, civil, and professional 
(especially the scientific community) operate, and how their agency 
and perceptions informs overall state policy. As Weldes (1996, p. 280) 
states, “the political and historical context in which national interests are 
fashioned, the intersubjective meanings which define state identities and 
interests, cannot arbitrarily be restricted to those meanings only produced 
in inter-state relations. After all, states are only analytically, but in fact, 
unitary actors.” Here, the views of the decision-makers responsible for 
overarching policymaking and bilateral negotiations (the executive level 
of government—King Abdullah II and the Royal Court in Jordan, and the 
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White House in the US; and specialized agencies – the Jordanian Atomic 
Energy Commission [JAEC] and the US Department of State’s Office for 
Nuclear Energy Safety and Security) are central in determining policy. 
Jordanian self-perceptions and the US perceptions of Jordan and 
its energy security situation are equally important in understanding the 
failure to successfully negotiate a “123” nuclear cooperation agreement. In 
an interesting and timely study that builds on earlier work (see Boulding, 
1959; Jervis, 1976), Hatem S. Abu-Lebdeh (1997) argued that national 
perceptions are pivotal in influencing the Jordanian–US relationship 
in general, and that their perceptions often differ from each other. 
Abu-Lebdeh argued that Jordanian decision-makers tend to perceive 
themselves, and Jordan in general, as beset with development and secu-
rity challenges; as a key US ally and moderating force in regional rela-
tions; and as having legitimate needs that must be pursued. On the other 
hand, the US decision-makers’ perceptions of Jordan are influenced by 
broader international contexts and are shaped by foreign policy goals 
which are grand and larger than just the interests of one small state.
Governmental decision-making can be approached in different ways 
but it is perhaps most useful to envision decision-making as constituted 
by a series of different processes, actors, and relationships that overlap 
and reinforce each other. The principle of Joseph Nye’s three-dimensional 
chess game model is useful to reflect upon here (Nye, 2004). Domestic 
and foreign policymaking are built on complex mechanisms for process-
ing and communicating information, reconciling competing interests and 
demands/constraints, and producing decisions to be acted upon (Milner, 
1997). At different levels of analysis within decision-making bodies, these 
mechanisms can differ. The influence of perceptions can be seen to take 
place at one of these levels. 
The creation of perceptions and how they impact decision-making is 
formed by three elements: first, self-perception (including of one’s own 
interests, rights, and needs); second, perception of the other (including 
their interests, rights, and needs); and finally, one’s agency (goals and 
capabilities). Policy is formed at the nexus where these three elements 
meet, influencing and reinforcing each other. In any bilateral relation-
ship, cooperation is determined by the compatibility of this nexus in 
each internal decision-making process. If the nexus of perceptions 
and agency are compatible with each other—the sum of the perceptions—
agency interaction results in policies that do not hinder or interfere with 
those of the other actor—then cooperation is likely to result. Where the 
perceptions–agency nexus are not only compatible but mirror each 
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other—the sum of the perceptions–agency interaction results in policies 
which directly support each other—then bilateral cooperation is certain 
to occur. At the same time, when the perceptions–agency nexus are not 
compatible with each other—the sum of the interactions results in policies 
which interfere, hinder, or directly oppose each other—then cooperation 
is not possible. Identifying the relevant perceptions and level of agency in 
the US–Jordanian nuclear technology relationship is, therefore, necessary 
in explaining the failure to cooperate on this issue. 
Consideration also needs to be given to how decision-makers perceive 
their country’s energy security situation. Energy security is a key con-
cern for all functioning states and markets and directly effects political 
and economic stability (Spero, 1973). Energy security is fundamentally 
about two things: the actual supply–demand balance and perception. 
David Deese (1979, p. 140) summarizes energy security as “a condition 
in which a nation perceives a high probability that it will have adequate 
energy supplies at affordable prices.” As such, governmental perceptions 
of energy security are important in determining energy security—it is 
perception that, in effect, determines the level of demand for energy sup-
plies that are necessary in order to achieve a measure of energy security. 
In the coming decades, it is likely that the pursuit of energy security will 
become an increasingly sensitive issue that plays out at the international 
level, perhaps leading to conflict (Moran & Russell, 2009). Furthermore, 
the interdependent nature of the domestic and international realms in an 
ever-globalizing and integrating world system results in a proliferation 
of challenges which influence policy responses. 
In the case of Jordanian–US nuclear energy, a process exists whereby 
a challenge/problem is identified, interests and capabilities considered, 
and domestic and foreign policies developed in order to respond to it. 
Here, the perceptions–agency nexus found in our model of governmental 
decision-making influences the domestic and foreign policy responses 
that seek to attend to the original challenge/problem. For Jordan, the 
challenge is resource scarcity and energy insecurity which lead to 
vulnerability. This results in a consideration of Jordanian interests and capa-
bilities (agency) and the creation of policies that are shaped by perceptions 
of self and other. For the US, the challenge/problem is managing inter- 
national nuclear technology proliferation, which represents a key secu-
rity challenge in the post-9/11 world and increases US vulnerability 
(in the form of nuclear-armed rogue states, terrorist activity, and so on). 
Washington constantly reviews its interests and capabilities in managing 
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this international issue. Again, here, the perceptions–agency nexus in gov-
ernment circles influences the US domestic and foreign policy responses.
Energy Insecurity and Jordan’s Nuclear Policy 
There are two key structural characteristics which reinforce Jordanian 
decision-makers’ view of Jordan’s energy security problem. The first is 
that Jordan has very few natural resources of any kind and has practically 
no reserves of useable hydrocarbons—and so relies almost entirely on 
imports of these fuels. The second is that domestic sources of renewable 
energy that could be utilized to increase its energy security are largely 
ignored. According to the Chairman of the JAEC, Dr Khaled Touqan, 
the Jordanian government is quite occupied with the problems of the 
country’s resource scarcity, which acts as one of the main influences on 
its national self-perception (Touqan, 2012). Unlike the majority of its 
neighbors, Jordan does not possess many natural resources in sufficient 
measure to meet its own demands. Jordan is the fourth-poorest state 
in the world in terms of freshwater sources (Aquastat), has no crude 
oil reserves and irrelevant natural gas reserves, but does have oil shale 
deposits. However, the extent of these reserves is not yet known (Luck, 
2012b; Obeidat, 2012). Furthermore, due to geostrategic processes in the 
Middle East, Jordan is extremely vulnerable to external events that can 
disrupt both its energy supply and market volatility. 
The 2003 war in Iraq, for example, cut off imports of oil which accounted 
for virtually all of Jordan’s total oil supplies, meaning these supplies had 
to be replaced through agreements with other regional oil producers 
(Awad, 2009, p. 5). More recently, the regime change process in Egypt 
has disrupted supplies of natural gas to Jordan (which the former supplies 
through the El-Arish pipeline in the Sinai Peninsula [which had also sup-
plied Israel with natural gas until late 2011]) due to sabotage on the pipeline 
(Obeidat, 2011). Since spring 2011, this has cost Jordan approximately $2.4 
billion due to converting power stations to use diesel and using Jordan’s 
strategic reserves of hydrocarbons (Luck, 2012a). At the same time, as 
international energy supplies become increasingly vulnerable, domestic 
electricity demand in Jordan is expected to triple to 8,000 MW by 2030, 
further compounding its insecurity (Abu-Dabbouh, 2012). 
Jordanians have a per capita freshwater consumption rate of less 
than 200 cubic meter (m3) per year—well below the United Nations 
(UN)-designated water poverty line of 1,000 m3 per year (El-Ashry, 
Saab & Zeitoon, 2010, p. 3). Having access to sufficient freshwater is 
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central for agricultural and industrial development, reducing poverty, 
raising living standards, and better healthcare, and as such the implica-
tions of Jordan’s freshwater scarcity are profound. It is generally accepted 
that one of the key pillars of any program in Jordan aimed at increasing 
freshwater supply hinges on desalinating sea water. However, this will 
require significant amounts of energy and therefore will require even 
greater energy imports if domestic energy sources are not developed. 
Already, total oil demand stands at approximately 110,000 barrels per 
day, all of which is imported from neighboring states, while total natu-
ral gas consumption is 3.01 billion m3 per year, of which 2.85 billion m3 
is imported. The total cost of Jordan’s energy imports was over US$ 
3.5 billion in 2011 (CIA World Factbook, 2011; UN Comtrade). These 
energy imports represented 25 percent of the government’s budget for 
2011 and were key causes of the budget deficit of around 10 percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) that Jordan has constantly faced for the 
past decade or so. 
The problem of resource scarcity is magnified by Jordan’s develop-
mental needs which are reliant on the availability of fuels at reasonable 
prices. The Jordanian economy has traditionally been characterized by 
a low level of industrial output, limited agricultural production, and the 
dominance of the services sector (El-Said, 2002, pp. 254–277). However, 
since the early 1990s, economic restructuring in Jordan has led to more 
emphasis on the need for industrial production, especially in higher value-
added manufacturing (see Knowles, 2005). The success of these and other 
industries, however, relies on the availability of cheap and stable supplies 
of energy in the long term. The current framework of Jordanian energy 
supply (foreign imports of hydrocarbons at volatile and high prices with 
no real domestic energy supply) is not conducive to long-term economic 
development and the Jordanian government is acutely aware of this. 
Reinforcing Jordan’s reliance on hydrocarbon imports is the underde-
veloped nature of its domestic renewable energy industry. Use of renew-
able energy sources is extremely limited compared to Jordan’s potential 
in this field. In particular, solar energy represents a vastly underutilized 
energy source in Jordan which receives some of the highest levels of 
concentrated solar energy in the world (Maytah, 2012a). According to 
Ayman Maytah,5 solar energy for household use (mainly photovoltaic roof 
installations) is currently only used on 10 percent of Jordanian buildings 
(Maytah, 2012b). Wind, thermal, and other renewable energy sources are 
not employed in Jordan. While there are initiatives underway to develop 
solar energy capacity in Jordan, these efforts are being led by the private 
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sector and university-based scientific and technological communities. 
However, governmental support for these projects is limited and the 
development of a nuclear energy program appears to have more support 
in decision-making circles (ibid.). There are initiatives being developed by 
the private and academic sectors which would utilize solar energy further, 
but they have to compete with the JAEC and nuclear energy initiatives 
for funding and governmental support.
On April 1, 2007, the then Jordanian Energy Minister, Khaled Sharida, 
announced that Jordan intended to build one nuclear power plant to pro-
duce electricity by 2015 (Stern, 2007). This announcement led observers to 
ask questions relating to economic development, environmental sustain-
ability, military and nuclear security, and energy security (see Caravelli 
2011; Marktanner & Salman, 2011). In particular, the development of 
a national nuclear energy program can become a major international 
political issue because of the perceived objectives and rationale behind 
it. The Jordanian government, through the Royal Court and the JAEC, 
for example, has often highlighted that energy security is one of the main 
challenges it faces (see Araj, 2010).
There are competing explanations as to why the Jordanian government 
has placed so much emphasis on nuclear energy generation. On the one 
hand, nuclear energy is genuinely seen as the most efficient, affordable, 
and effective solution to Jordan’s energy needs in the medium to long term 
by parts of the Jordanian government (such as the JAEC). On the other 
hand, the position held by those who do not support the nuclear energy 
program is that the governmental bodies charged with finding solutions 
to Jordan’s energy security needs have not given sufficient consideration 
to the alternatives to nuclear technology (Abu-Dabbouh, 2012). For 
example, on May 30, 2012, a majority of deputies in the Lower House of 
the Parliament voted in favor of a recommendation by the Parliament’s 
Energy and Mineral Resources Committee to halt work on the nuclear 
program. The legally binding recommendation called for a hold on any 
further development of the program until economic and environmental 
feasibility studies are completed and the JAEC releases complete infor-
mation on the expected costs of the program (Omari, 2012). In reply, the 
JAEC declared that its activities will continue as they are in line with the 
requirements of the parliamentary recommendation as work was only 
being done on completing an economic feasibility study (Luck, 2012c).
Regardless of how the government’s interest in nuclear energy has 
arisen, its perception of its planned nuclear energy program is quite clear. 
King Abdullah II himself has been a key advocate of the nuclear program 
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and has charged the JAEC to pursue nuclear energy as a priority (HRH 
King Abdullah II, 2012). King Abdullah has also expressed concern and 
disappointment with the delays and difficulties in establishing the program 
the country has faced—even officially blaming the Israeli government 
for sabotaging his government’s attempts to cooperate with nuclear sup-
plier states (HRH King Abdullah II, 2012). Official statements from the 
Royal Court, the Ministry of Energy, the Jordanian Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (JNRC), and the JAEC (Araj, 2010), as well as discussions 
taking place within these institutions, highlight that the government has 
several key opinions on nuclear energy. First, there is the view that Jordan 
faces a severe energy security challenge that is restricting development, 
reducing quality of life in Jordanian society (through rising living costs), 
and is untenable even in the short-term future. Second, there is a belief 
that Jordan has inalienable rights as a signatory of the NPT; that it has 
been entirely transparent about its nuclear energy plans; and has been 
forthcoming by approaching members of the international community and 
signing bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements.6 Third, the Jordanian 
government believes that it has long been a supportive ally of the US 
and other Western powers in international relations more broadly, and 
in particular has been a stabilizing and peaceful actor in the Middle East. 
At the same time, the Jordanian government sees the US as a key ally 
that has supported Jordan’s political and economic goals—with the US–
Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (discussed later) demonstrating 
the close relationship they enjoy.
In short, the Jordanian government has identified key policy drivers: its 
desire to increase domestic energy supplies while reducing energy imports 
in order to achieve a greater sense of energy security. It is expected that 
this, in turn, will facilitate further industrialization, poverty reduction, 
the desalination of sea water to produce freshwater (which requires sig-
nificant energy input, which Jordan currently does not have the capacity 
for), and other aspects of economic development. The policy output of 
the government’s assessment is to pursue a national nuclear energy pro-
gram. Furthermore, the government’s approach regarding bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, its transparency with its plans and capabilities, as 
well as its rights under the NPT and the additional protocols signed have 
led the government to develop plans for a domestically fuelled nuclear 
energy program. Here, the discovery of up to 120,000 tons of uranium ore 
in Jordan over the past several years (Touqan, 2012) combined with these 
policy goals and self-perceptions have compelled the decision-makers in 
Amman to conclude that their nuclear energy program should include 
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the capacity to mine and enrich domestic uranium in order to provide 
fuel for its nuclear reactors (ibid.). According to Khaled Touqan, the 
Jordanian government views buying nuclear fuel on the international 
market to be unnecessary and that this would leave Jordan in the same 
situation of vulnerability as it now finds itself in. On the other hand, having 
a domestic source of energy would significantly reduce its vulnerability, 
energy insecurity, and budget deficit (ibid.).
With this conviction, the JAEC is due to select one bid from a choice 
of three short-listed to build Jordan’s first nuclear reactor (Luck, 2011a). 
The vendor selected will be given a contract to build and operate the 
reactor which is likely to be a Generation III 1,000 MW reactor and 
is scheduled to come online by the end of 2018 (Touqan, 2012). The 
multinational corporations (MNCs) short-listed are as follows: a joint 
bid by AREVA (French) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japanese), 
Canadian AECL, and the Russian firm, Atomstroyexport. AREVA has 
also been involved in uranium exploration in Jordan since 2009 and in 
2010, signed an agreement to continue explorations and mine uranium ore 
(Luck, 2012d). Site location and safety studies have been conducted by 
Tractebel Engineering (a Belgian corporation) since late 2009 (Attwood, 
2009) and a site near Mafraq has been suggested as the location of the 
first nuclear power plant. 
Jordan has institutionalized cooperation with a number of key 
international actors in the form of nuclear cooperation agreements. 
However, the first such agreement that the Jordanian government 
pursued, a “123” agreement with the US, has not been signed and nego-
tiations which started in early 2008 have been suspended since early 
2011 (Luck, 2011b). 
The US Policy toward Jordan
The US–Jordanian “123” nuclear cooperation negotiations that took place 
from 2008 until early 2011 were problematic (Luck, 2011b). The Jordanian 
government approached the US administration in late 2007 before turn-
ing to other governments but an agreement was never reached.7 While 
Jordan and the US have long had a constructive relationship and been 
close allies (with Jordan receiving major non-NATO [North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization] ally status from the US on November 12, 1996), 
the sensitivity of issues related to nuclear technology has proven to be 
insurmountable thus far. The key problem in the negotiations was the 
Jordanian government’s intention to enrich uranium ore within its own 
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borders in order to provide itself with domestically sourced fuel for its 
planned nuclear reactors. However, the US position on this matter fits 
into its broader international policy of limiting enrichment capacity and 
so, Washington has insisted that Jordan forego the right to enrich ura-
nium (and develop other sensitive technologies such as the production of 
heavy water) in order for a “123” agreement to be signed (Kerr, 2012). 
The Obama administration has made it clear that it views securing 
vulnerable nuclear fuels and strengthening international efforts to man-
age nuclear fuel cycles as a top priority. At the opening plenary session of 
the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit hosted in Washington, DC, President 
Obama remarked that “[t]wo decades after the end of the Cold War, we 
face a cruel irony of history – the risk of a nuclear confrontation between 
nations has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack has gone up” 
(Obama, 2010). President Obama reiterated this point about international 
security and non-proliferation at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit held 
in Seoul, South Korea, stating in his opening remarks:
[t]here are still too many bad actors in search of these dangerous materials, 
and these dangerous materials are still vulnerable in too many places. It would 
not take much – just a handful or so of these materials – to kill hundreds 
of thousands of innocent people. And that’s not an exaggeration; that’s the 
reality that we face. (Obama, 2012)
In addition, the US government views the creation of nuclear fuel 
banks as important in managing the global nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear 
materials, and ensuring that they are not diverted for use in weapons. 
According to this US position, new enrichment capacity in Jordan or 
other states developing nuclear energy programs would undermine this 
strategy and its goal of managing nuclear fuels (Kerr,8 2012). In 2005, for 
example, the US announced that it would use 17.4 tonnes of its surplus 
highly enriched uranium to be reprocessed as low-enriched uranium to 
be used as a fuel reserve. This fuel bank, called the American Assured 
Fuel Supply (AFS), would be used to supply other states with fuel for 
nuclear power stations. The then Secretary of Energy, Samual Bodeman, 
described this initiative as helping countries to pursue nuclear energy 
“without the burden of producing their own fuel, while curbing the 
spread of sensitive technology” (NNSA, 2006). The AFS was declared 
operational on August 18, 2011 (NNSA, 2011). 
In February 2006, the US government proposed an international 
partnership initiative that would facilitate cooperation between states in 
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developing the use of nuclear technology for energy purposes as well as 
create a regime to manage the nuclear fuel cycle. This initiative became 
known as the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) and by early 
2007, over 20 states had joined, including Jordan. The intention of the 
GNEP was to coordinate international processes for mining, enriching, 
and transporting uranium and other materials for use in nuclear energy 
reactors (Nikitin, Andrews & Holt, 2011, pp. 27–30). The initiative called 
for the maintenance and enhancement of the status quo with uranium 
enrichment capacity remaining under the control of those states which 
already supply enriched nuclear fuels to the international market and 
those who do not have the capacity being unable to develop it in the 
future. Under the initiative, uranium ore would be mined in producer 
states, exported to be enriched in states that have these facilities, like the 
US, and then exported for use in nuclear plants. Producer states would 
be able to sell their uranium ore but would have to buy back enriched 
uranium (which, naturally, would be more expensive in relative terms). 
Spent fuel would also be sent to the states with advanced capacities to 
be stored or reprocessed and re-exported again as fuel (ibid., pp. 27–29). 
Under this regime, Jordan, for example, would be allowed to mine 
uranium ore but would not develop its own enrichment capabilities. 
Instead it would export the ore to an advanced nuclear state, say, the US, 
and then buy back enriched uranium, while the reprocessing state would 
be able to export the remaining enriched uranium. According to Khaled 
Touqan, Jordan may be able to mine over 60,000 tonnes of uranium ore 
but would only need approximately 300 tonnes of processed ore for its 
own nuclear energy program (Touqan, 2012). The potential remaining 
ore represents a significant future export commodity for Jordan.
For the US government, the GNEP initiative represented a reinforce-
ment of international efforts to manage nuclear fuels and ensure security 
challenges were minimized (non-proliferation of weapons) (Nikitin et al., 
2011, pp. 27–29). However, the GNEP has also been seen as reinforcing 
discrimination between producers and consumers, ensuring the depen-
dency of states that do not have enrichment capability on those that do. 
By mid-2009, support for the project had begun to wane and even in the 
US, Congress announced the end of funding for domestic projects in 
the US that were linked to the GNEP (such as the research and devel-
opment of further reprocessing and storage technologies). In 2010, the 
GNEP was replaced by the International Framework for Nuclear Energy 
Cooperation (IFNEC) which preserves the key focus on nuclear fuel cycle 
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management set out in the GNEP in terms of limiting the proliferation 
of enrichment capabilities (IFNEC, 2011). The US position on Jordan’s 
plans to include enrichment capacity in its program corresponds directly 
to the IFNEC policies (Kerr, 2012), demonstrating how the US policy 
toward Jordan sits within this broader framework.
Another concern, as discussed in a recent Congressional Research 
Service paper (Kerr, Holt & Nikitin, 2011), relates directly to the prolif- 
eration of uranium enrichment capabilities and the impact this would have 
on increasing the amount of enriched uranium on international markets. 
This appears to be linked to the US and Russian plans to expand their 
own enrichment capabilities as part of the process of converting highly 
enriched uranium from dismantled nuclear weapons into low-enriched 
uranium for use in nuclear power plants (ibid.). This anticipated extra 
supply of fuel along with current global enrichment capabilities means 
there is enough fuel for current and planned nuclear energy plants 
for the next decade or so and, therefore, there is no need for extra fuel 
on the world market at this time (Squassoni, 2009). 
The US–Jordanian negotiations went on at a much slower pace than 
those with other states with which Jordan has signed agreements. The slow 
pace of these negotiations is very interesting in light of how rapidly the 
US and Jordanian governments have managed to sign major agreements 
in the past decade or so, in particular the FTA of late 2000 which, at the 
time, was only the fourth bilateral FTA signed by the US. The US govern-
ment argued that Jordan does not need to enrich uranium domestically 
but should instead sell its uranium ore resources on the global market 
and buy back enriched uranium from the cheapest supplier according to 
market mechanisms (Touqan, 2012). Amman, on the other hand, has not 
agreed to this claiming that it would simply leave it in the same position 
of relying on external sources of fuel that has caused its current energy 
insecurity and budgetary woes. 
It is important to note that a 2009 “123” agreement between the US 
and the UAE for nuclear energy development in the latter included text 
that stipulates that the UAE will not seek to enrich uranium domesti-
cally but will purchase it on the global market (United States of America 
Department of State [USADS], 2008). This agreement is now often 
referred to as the “Gold Standard” (see Anon, 2011, p. 7) in Washington 
circles and is seen by the Jordanian government as somewhat weakening 
the case for its own uranium enrichment plans. The US–UAE agreement 
states that the latter will not seek to enrich uranium ore or reprocess spent 
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fuel and that if it should seek to do so, bilateral cooperation in this field 
would cease (Blanchard & Kerr, 2009, p. 6). Indeed, at the same time that 
Jordan and other Middle Eastern states are planning to develop nuclear 
energy programs with enrichment capacity, the US and other current 
nuclear states are developing plans for a multilateral nuclear fuel bank 
entailing maintenance of the status quo in terms of who has enrichment 
capacities (Lettow, 2010). 
According to a senior member of the US Department of State’s Office 
for Nuclear Energy Safety and Security (which was responsible for 
negotiating the “123” agreement with the Jordanian government), the 
US government perceives Jordanian interests and policy with regards 
to its nuclear program, and the US–Jordanian relations in general, in a 
broader global context (Anon, 2012).9 Here, there seems to be a great 
deal of concern in decision-making circles in Washington when it comes 
to control over nuclear fuels and the number of sources for enriched 
uranium internationally. A large number of Hearings at the House of 
Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs that deals with nuclear 
technology proliferation, for example, are dominated by discussions of 
weaponization, terrorist threats, and rogue states (ibid., 2011). In particu-
lar, Iran features prominently when the Middle East is discussed. In other 
Congressional debates, there is certainly a sense that consideration of 
the national interests of some developing states is up against consideration 
of US policies relating to broader international/global processes—and the 
latter tends to overcome the former. Hearings in the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations demonstrate the same tendency. 
Ultimately, the US does not perceive the Jordanian case as unique or 
exceptional—while, naturally, the Jordanian government does. It is this 
perception disparity that seems to have hindered bilateral negotiations 
and eventually led to their suspension. Concerns over the direction of 
political change in the Middle East and how this would affect Jordan 
also are likely to have been central in the US policy and the timing of the 
suspension of the negotiations – which maps directly to the start of the 
Arab Spring and destabilization in some states in February and March 
2011. However, some bilateral governmental cooperation has taken place, 
simply not within the context of a “123” agreement. For example, in 2010, 
the US Department of Energy provided funds through its Global Threat 
Reduction Fund for the construction of Jordan’s first storage facility for 
nuclear waste (Hazaimeh, 2010). The supply of technology, financial 
resources, and expertise in the construction of power plants and related 
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infrastructure will not, however, be permitted in the absence of a “123” 
agreement and US-based corporations will not be allowed to be involved 
in Jordan’s program. 
Conclusions 
In understanding how the Jordanian government perceives its planned 
nuclear energy program, we have to consider how it perceives the energy 
security problem the country faces, its economic and political interests, 
and its capabilities. A near-total dependency on external sources of energy 
has resulted in a growing fuel bill that accounts for a large portion of GDP 
and the government’s growing budget deficit. As confirmed by Khaled 
Touqan (2012), the Jordanian government perceives energy security as 
one of its primary short- to medium-term goals and believes that this is 
clear for external actors (such as the US) to see. The Jordanian govern-
ment (and the JAEC in particular) believes that new domestically fuelled 
energy programs are necessary to, first, meet the current and projected 
domestic energy demand, and second, to reduce Jordan’s energy insecu-
rity. In the case of the nuclear energy program, the Jordanian government 
perceives itself as having the right to enrich its domestically sourced ura-
nium to ensure its planned reactors will have a secure supply of fuel. In 
addition, the government sees the nuclear program as being transparent.
The US government does not hold the same views of at least some 
elements of Jordan’s planned program. In particular, the US government 
has not supported the Jordanian desire to enrich uranium domestically. 
This position is consistent with broader US policies on nuclear technology 
proliferation and is not specific to the Jordanian case. Concerns over the 
proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies and organization within 
the global nuclear fuel market are paramount here and considerations 
of Jordan’s energy insecurity are not significant enough to overrule the 
broader US policy. Satisfying the Jordanian desire for reliance on domes-
tic fuel sources is simply not as important as ensuring that nuclear fuels 
remain controled internationally (the potential costs outweigh the benefits 
in this case). Ultimately, the perceptions–agency nexus in Washington 
and Amman are not compatible with each other, and the Jordanian and 
US perceptions of the former’s energy insecurity, the aims and capacities 
of its planned nuclear program, and the need for uranium enrichment 
are not in line with each other. While there are no indications that this 
will change in the coming years, the Jordanian government is still likely 
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to pursue nuclear energy without an agreement with the US, and in turn, 
the US is not likely to sign future agreements that offer less than the 
US–UAE agreement of 2009. 
Further study on this bilateral relationship and others seems neces-
sary in order to more fully understand how decision-makers’ perceptions 
can change over time and how the intersubjective meanings assigned 
to national interests interplay with perceived national capabilities in 
nuclear policy. Applying a model combining perceptions of self, other, 
and agency to the US–Jordanian “123” negotiations has allowed us to test 
its applicability to bilateral nuclear relations. This study demonstrates the 
value of contributing to analyses which consider states as unitary actors 
by considering decision-making processes within the state and the impact 
that differing socially constructed perceptions can have on policy and 
ultimately, whether cooperation emerges. Having tested this model on 
this case stud, however, it is clear that while it is applicable and can further 
our analyses of this case study and others, it could be useful to deepen the 
analysis to include an assessment of the impact of no nuclear cooperation 
on other issues and processes in the US–Jordanian relationship. 
NOTES
1. States that already have advanced nuclear programs (both weaponized 
and/or civilian), including the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), 
France, Russia, and Germany. 
2. So named after Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, titled 
“Cooperation with Other Nations,” which establishes the conditions for 
any nuclear cooperation between the US and other countries.
3. In order to understand the nature of the Jordanian nuclear energy program 
and how the Jordanian and US governments view its purpose, I have carried 
out an extensive literature review of primary and secondary sources covering 
academic, governmental, and private sector material relating to the Jordanian 
nuclear energy program. In addition, I have conducted in-depth interviews 
with key decision-makers, including His Excellency Dr Khaled Touqan, 
Chairman of the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) and the chief 
negotiator with the US; Haifa Al-Khraisha, the Head of the International 
Affairs Unit of the Royal Court; and leading members of the scientific and 
academic communities in Jordan, along with senior members of the US 
Department of State’s Office for Nuclear Energy Safety and Security, and 
the US Congressional Research Service. 
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4. India acquired nuclear weapons in 1974, and had fought wars with China 
(1962) and Pakistan (1947–1948, 1965, 1971); Israel is implicitly believed 
to have acquired nuclear weapons possibly as early as 1965 (exact year 
unknown due to the undeclared nature of Israel’s program) and had fought 
wars with neighboring states in 1948 and 1956; Pakistan acquired nuclear 
weapons in 1998 and had fought wars with India (1947–1948, 1965, 1971); 
and North Korea acquired nuclear weapons in 2006 having fought the 
1950–1953 war with a coalition of states led by the US and South Korea. 
5. Ayman Maytah is Vice President of the American University in Madaba and 
Jordan’s leading solar energy specialist.
6. At the time of writing, 11 bilateral agreements had been signed: Argentina, 
Canada, China, France, Japan, Romania, Russia, Spain, South Korea, Turkey, 
and the UK. Negotiations were being held with three others: Czech Republic, 
Italy, and the US (suspended). 
7. Although this author has seen a signed copy of a US–Jordan “123” agree-
ment dated 7 February 2008, it was (according to the Jordanian government) 
canceled by the US several months later. The US Department of State’s 
Office of Nuclear Energy Safety and Security has declined to comment on 
this particular issue. 
8. Paul Kerr is a senior analyst on nuclear non-proliferation at the US Con- 
gressional Research Service, Washington, DC.
9. The interviewee wished to remain anonymous as the interviewee was 
not authorized to comment on Jordan’s nuclear energy program or the 
US–Jordanian relations. 
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